Posted by Brian Leiter on November 27, 2009 at 08:08 PM in Philosophy in the News, What is Philosophy? | Permalink
According to Google Scholar (in parentheses: total number of on-line articles and books citing the book in question):
1. Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (37,197)
2. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (26,768)
3. Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (7,892)
4. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (7,169)
5. Karl Popper, Conjectures and Refutations (6,516)
6. Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue (6,579)
7. Gilbert Ryle, The Concept of Mind (6,356)
7. John Rawls, Political Liberalism (6,352)
9. Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (6,246)
9. H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law (6,212)
11. Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (5,616)
12. John Searle, Speech Acts (5,387)
13. Jerry Fodor, Modularity of Mind (5,050)
14. Daniel Dennett, Consciousness Explained (4,810)
15. Karl Popper, Objective Knowledge (4,701)
Runners-up: Saul Kripke, Naming and Necessity (4,535); W.V.O. Quine, Word and Object (4,565); Paul Feyerabend, Against Method (4,420); Richard Rorty, Contingency, Irony and Solidarity (4,011); Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self (3,233); Jerry Fodor, The Language of Thought (3,292); Carl Hempel, Aspects of Scientific Explanation (3,137); David Chalmers, The Conscious Mind (3,065), Daniel Dennett, The Intentional Stance (2,985); Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons (2,972).
Since Google Scholar put law reviews on-line recently, that gives a big advantage to books in political and legal philosophy. In addition, any philosphical work of interest to psychologists or linguists does very well, since those two disciplines have substantial on-line presences, more so than other fields.
UPDATE: I'm opening comments, so some of the philosophers with whom I've been corresponding about how to define what's included and what's not, as well as those with other corrections/addenda to the list, can post their thoughts. Full signature and valid e-mail please!
Posted by Brian Leiter on November 27, 2009 at 09:04 AM in Philosophical Gourmet Report, Philosophy in the News, What is Philosophy? | Permalink | Comments (8)
Posted by Brian Leiter on November 26, 2009 at 09:45 AM in "The less they know, the less they know it", Authoritarianism and Fascism Alerts, Of Cultural Interest | Permalink
The right-wing crazies--in the U.S., this phrase is now mostly redundant, I realize--have been going beserk about hacked e-mails from climate scientists which they believe--since they are dumb as well as crazy--reveal a vast conspiracy to manipulate data on global warming. There is a clear explanation of what the hacked e-mails actually reveal here.
UPDATE: This incident illustrates a more general problem, namely, when failures of the peer review process are exploited for partisan political purposes. We've seen this, of course, in the context of th ID creationism scam.
ANOTHER: Statements from the University of East Anglia, where the climate scientists whose e-mails were hacked work. Dr. Jones concedes that the stolen e-mails "don't read well." Goodness, they read better than mine--no expletives, for example. And that scholars would be incensed when crackpots and ideological hacks sneak their work into ordinarily reputable journals is hardly surprising.
Posted by Brian Leiter on November 25, 2009 at 11:59 AM in "The less they know, the less they know it", Of Cultural Interest | Permalink
Posted by Brian Leiter on November 25, 2009 at 10:21 AM in Philosophy in the News, What is Philosophy? | Permalink
From his welcome remarks at the White House dinner for the Indian prime minister:
This wasn't quite what Kant had in mind, I suspect.As we all know, in India some of life's most treasured moments are often celebrated under the cover of a beautiful tent. It's a little like tonight. We have incredible food and music and are surrounded by great friends. For it's been said that "the most beautiful things in the universe are the starry heavens above us and the feeling of duty within us."
Mr. Prime Minister, today we worked to fulfill our duty --bring our countries closer together than ever before. Tonight, under the stars, we celebrate the spirit that will sustain our partnership -- the bonds of friendship between our people.
(Thanks to David Wood for the pointer.)
UPDATE: Jacob Stegenga (UCSD) writes:
A quick internet scan suggests that Obama's quote is (also) an Indian proverb; given that Obama was hosting the Indian Prime Minister, it seems plausible that Obama's speechwriter was actually quoting this proverb. This would also explain Obama's locution "it's been said that..."
Do you know if Kant explicitly borrowed his famous line from India? A quick look at the SEP on Kant's intellectual development shows nothing. Another quick internet scan shows nothing on the source of the proverb. Perhaps we've found a nice mystery of intellectual history!
Certainly when Obama does unKantian things like not sign the land mine treaty, one wonders about the depth of his understanding of things Kantian. In any case, I've opened comments, since I'm sure some scholar out there knows the answer to the question whether the Indian proverb derives from Kant or vice versa?
Posted by Brian Leiter on November 25, 2009 at 10:13 AM in Philosophy in the News | Permalink | Comments (1)
Posted by Brian Leiter on November 24, 2009 at 09:03 PM in Advice for Academic Job Seekers | Permalink
A commenter on the piece by Carlin Romano we have been discussing posted the following definitions at the CHE site:
ROMANO, verb. To criticize an academic discipline as if from within by making snide over-generalizations, baselessly questioning the good faith of the discipline's practitioners, etc.
E.g., "In saying '[philosophy] departments teem with abstruse courses mainly of interest to the tenured professors who teach them' and 'professional philosophers, whose egos and identities are deeply connectd to an image of themselves as intellectually superior to other professionals' Carlin really romanos philosophy."
ROMANO, noun. A large, cheese-like block of snark with which one romanos by grating and liberally sprinkling it throughout an essay. E.g., "Why did Carlin go so heavy on the romano in that piece in the Chroncile? His point was an interesting one; surely he could have made it without all that romano."
Posted by Brian Leiter on November 24, 2009 at 09:15 AM in "The less they know, the less they know it", Personal Ads of the Philosophers (and other humor), Philosophy in the News | Permalink
OK, that isn't quite the title of this call for a "philosophy of journalism" from Carlin Romano, whose unhappy forays into philosophy we have noted before, but it is hard not to think this question doesn't lie behind Mr. Romano's latest musings, given that he's a reader of this blog:
This is amusing on many levels, from the idea that Mr. Romano, who is wholly in the dark about philosophy (as we've seen before), has been living any kind of life in philosophy, to the idea that what afflicts philosophers is that they aren't "quick-witted on their feet," to his trademark anti-intellectualism in dismissing the core concerns of philosophy for millenia. If, in fact, Mr. Romano is able to "laugh off the scorn directed at" him by philosophers, it's far from obvious from this self-serving display. In any case, Kathryn Norlock, a philosopher at St. Mary's College of Maryland, who called Mr. Romano's piece to my attention, offered the following pertinent observations about it, which she gave me permission to share:If you examine philosophy-department offerings around America, you'll find staple courses in "Philosophy of Law," "Philosophy of Art," "Philosophy of Science," "Philosophy of Religion," and a fair number of other areas that make up our world....
Why, then, don't you find "Philosophy of Journalism" among those staple courses? Why does philosophy, the academic discipline charged to reflect the noblest intellectual enterprise, avoid the subject while departments teem with abstruse courses mainly of interest to the tenured professors who teach them?...
How can it be that journalism and philosophy, the two humanistic intellectual activities that most boldly (and some think obnoxiously) vaunt their primary devotion to truth, are barely on speaking terms?
The explanations require a sociology of both professional philosophy and journalism, too large a project for this space, but worth thumbnailing anyway....
Unlike science, journalism long carried (and still does for many) the association of superficial intellectual goods. That made linkage with it unappealing to professional philosophers, whose egos and identities are deeply connected to an image of themselves as intellectually superior to other professionals....
Add to this the historic insularity and inflexibility of philosophy—the field remains less diverse and intellectually adventurous than any of the other humanities—and the recipe for philosophical ignoring of journalism and new media was practically complete.Other factors—highly human ones—also kick in, reflecting mainstream American values. A vast and mutual reservoir of condescension exists between American journalists and philosophers. Many philosophers think of journalists as B or even C students (we're talking pre-grade-inflation here), people who have committed themselves to simplistic narratives of the world shorn of nuance and qualification, fond of every fallacy in the book, all made worse by the pompous, officious, in-your-face personality associated with reporters in the popular imagination...
Journalists, in turn, often regard philosophy professors (though not all humanists) as mannered figures, badly informed and out of touch on matters outside their academic competence, insufficiently quick-witted on their feet, irrelevant in their influence on the public, and ludicrously inefficient in their Anglophilic and pedantic diction....This makes philosophers, among other things, impossible guests on talk shows and hopeless sources for quotation....
As someone who has tried to live a life in both fields for 30 years, I find journalists understand this state of affairs better than philosophy professors do. The former note the scorn directed at them by the latter and largely laugh it off. The latter often falsely think they are held in higher regard by fellow professionals than is the case.
Like Romano, I am keenly interested in seeing more philosophy classes attend to media, but perhaps that’s why I find this discussion of its importance so disappointing and baffling. Setting aside my annoyance at “thumbnailing” being a verb now, is it really the case that by not covering one aspect of the world, philosophers have abdicated our responsibility to cover it at all? And at a time when most philosophy departments “teem” with introductory survey courses in which we professors earnestly try to cover a great deal of the world in service to students majoring in other departments, where are these “ossified departments” which abound in “abstruse” elective courses serving only professors’ interests? Ah, I see, Yale is the only department the author mentions by name! That answers that question. My bemusement only increases when the author reports that journalists “note the scorn directed at them” by philosophy professors. This is just bizarre, as every philosopher I know reads a newspaper on a daily basis, and has never expressed scorn regarding the profession. Perhaps the author confuses scorn for individuals’ particularly bad outings with scorn for an entire enterprise, in which case, I hope my impatience with Romano’s characterizations is not taken as derision for all philosophers (for then, I would be denigrating myself).
As long-time readers know, I, unlike Professor Norlock, share Karl Kraus's dim view of journalists ("No ideas and the ability to express them: that's a journalist!"), but there are obviously honorable exceptions, even if Mr. Romano is not one of them. As to why "philosophy of journalism" is not a major topic of philosophical study, I would have thought the answer obvious: it's not a central or substantial intellectual or cultural practice, unlike science, art, or law. The idea that "philosophy of journalism" would displace the central subjects of the discipline for millenia--metaphysics, epistemology, value theory (the ones too "abtruse" for Mr. Romano to understand)--is sufficiently silly that only a journalist could propose it. Summon Mr. Kraus!
Posted by Brian Leiter on November 24, 2009 at 08:28 AM in "The less they know, the less they know it", Philosophy in the News, What is Philosophy? | Permalink
Posted by Brian Leiter on November 23, 2009 at 09:31 AM in Philosophy in the News | Permalink
Hannes Leitgeb, professor of philosophy and mathematics at the University of Bristol, has senior offers from the Departments of Philosophy at Stanford University and the University of Groningen. Students interested in mathematical and philosophical logic considering any of these departments should keep an eye on what happens.
Posted by Brian Leiter on November 23, 2009 at 08:51 AM in Philosophy Updates | Permalink
An American philosopher writes:
Many of us in US colleges and universities have received requests from Chinese MA or PhD students asking for permission for a year of study in our program in the US. The request is often "I have received funding from the government for a year of study in the United States. However, I need to be admitted to a good program first. Can you please admit me to your program?" I have recently learned that very few students have received such funding from the government. However, if they can get admitted to a program, the government will supply the funding. There is no merit-based, government-directed scholarship program in China for study in the US. This program is entirely driven by the ambition of certain, not necessarily well-qualified, students, and the gullibility of US professors. I wonder if those of us who have hosted such students would be willing to share their experiences. My purpose in writing is not to lessen opportunities for Chinese students to study in the US. In fact, I'd like to see an increase in these opportunities. But I think we should think together about how to attract highly qualified Chinese students who could profit from a year or two of study in the US, and return to China to make a contribution to China's philosophical development.
Posted by Brian Leiter on November 23, 2009 at 06:23 AM in Issues in the Profession | Permalink | Comments (16)
Jonathan Schaffer (metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of language) and Susanna Schellenberg (philosophy of mind, epistemology), both at the Australian National University, have accepted tenured offers as, respectively, professor and associate professor at Rutgers University at New Brunswick, to start in January 2011. (They may also continue some part-time affiliation with the ANU; I will post details when they are available.)
Schaffer is actually the first Rutgers graduate to be hired back to the faculty, after a decade of teaching, first at the University of Massachussetts at Amherst, then at the ANU.
Posted by Brian Leiter on November 20, 2009 at 11:43 AM in Philosophy Updates | Permalink
Alastair Norcross (Colorado) reports that the National Board of the American Philosophical Association has now taken action on an initiative that began with a letter from Charles Hermes (UT Arlington) (posted here last February) and then a petition he crafted (signed by over 1400 philosophers) followed by a motion put before the APA by Professor Norcross and with support from many others. Professor Norcross reports that the Board of the APA has now adopted the following language for its anti-discrimination policy:
The American Philosophical Association rejects as unethical all forms of discrimination based on race, color, religion, political convictions, national origin, sex, disability, sexual orientation, gender identification or age, whether in graduate admissions, appointments, retention, promotion and tenure, manuscript evaluation, salary determination, or other professional activities in which APA members characteristically participate. This includes both discrimination on the basis of status and discrimination on the basis of conduct integrally connected to that status, where "integrally connected" means (a) the conduct is a normal and predictable expression of the status (e.g., sexual conduct expressive of a sexual orientation), or (b) the conduct is something that only a person with that status could engage in (e.g., pregnancy), or (c) the proscription of that conduct is historically and routinely connected with invidious discrimination against the status (e.g., interracial marriage). At the same time, the APA recognizes the special commitments and roles of institutions with a religious affiliation; and it is not inconsistent with the APA's position against discrimination to adopt religious affiliation as a criterion in graduate admissions or employment policies when this is directly related to the school's religious affiliation or purpose, so long as these policies are made known to members of the philosophical community and so long as the criteria for such religious affiliation do not discriminate against persons according to the other attributes listed in this statement. Advertisers in Jobs for Philosophers are expected to comply with this fundamental commitment of the APA, which is not to be taken to preclude explicitly stated affirmative action initiatives.
Professor Norcross writes (this is his unofficial account of what transpired--presumably a formal statement from the APA will be forthcoming):
This statement will be displayed on the page where institutions buy ad space for JFP, and they will be asked to check a box to indicate that they are in compliance with our statement. If they do not check this box, a flag (i.e. a symbolic marking, like the dagger sign currently used to flag censured institutions) will automatically be added to the ad. The flag will say something like this: this institution has not indicated that it complies with the APA Nondiscrimination Statement.
In addition, the APA will fully investigate any complaints about institutions that may not be in compliance with our nondiscrimination statement, a flag will be used to mark ads taken out by any institution that is found not to be in compliance, and this flag will state that, following a full investigation, the APA has determined that the institution is not in compliance with the APA Statement on Nondiscrimination.
A proposal was on the table to disallow ads from institutions that either do not check off compliance with our statement or that are investigated and found not to be in compliance.
A number of reasons were given against this proposal. For example, if an institution that cannot advertise in JFP cannot use our placement service and if the number of institutions that would not be allowed to advertise is large enough, then we might reasonably expect there to develop a second, parallel job market. This would substantially burden jobseekers, and it would also deprive the APA a substantial source of power is has to promote equity (a power that it has historically wielded to good effect, e.g. by helping to ensure equitable treatment to female jobseekers).
The Board also considered having a single flag instead of two. The two-flag option was thought to have several benefits. Since it's not feasible to investigate what happens at hundreds or thousands of institutions (whose practices change over time) that might advertise in JFP, it was thought useful to jobseekers if JFP automatically records whether the institution indicated compliance. If it does not indicate compliance, that puts jobseekers on notice. However, ads are in many cases placed by office staff whom we cannot hold responsible for making an accurate declaration of compliance with our statement. Moreover, a representative of an institution that does in fact comply with our statement may yet refuse to check the compliance box because they believe that it's inappropriate to be asked to do so. For these reason, the first flag can only say that the institution did not indicate compliance. At the same time, it was thought that there should be a way to warn jobseekers about institutions that have been investigated and been found not to be in compliance, and this is the function of the second flag.
There was also some discussion of how institutions might be investigated and there was consensus that existing procedures should be used, with the understanding that the LGBT Committee may take the lead in identifying non-complying institutions.
I think this is a pretty good result, and the National Board is to be commended. Part of me wants to deny advertising space altogether to the offending institutions, but I think the reasons given to go with the censure route make sense. On balance, I would probably have supported this result, if I had been there. I am particularly pleased that the act-orientation canard has finally been put to bed by the new wording of the policy.
This is, indeed, good news, and we owe thanks to Professors Hermes and Norcross in particular for their work in securing this result, and also to the members of the Board for doing the right thing. Signed comments--full name and valid e-mail address--are welcome from readers.
HINT for the reading impaired: the stuff in bold means what it says, especially for the two who have tried to post comments criticizing or mocking the APA for doing the right thing. Sign your actual name with a valid e-mail address if you want your critical comments to appear.
Posted by Brian Leiter on November 19, 2009 at 01:57 PM in Issues in the Profession | Permalink | Comments (24)
Posted by Brian Leiter on November 19, 2009 at 01:32 PM in Authoritarianism and Fascism Alerts, Texas Taliban Alerts (Intelligent Design, Religion in the Schools, etc.) | Permalink
David Chalmers explains the idea behind this fun survey meant to gauge the distribution of philosophical opinions about a range of traditional and au courant philosophical issues. You will, however, need a PhilPapers account or a 'guest' account for survey purposes--the instructions will prompt you for that purpose. Try it out! This is not just for "party line analytics" either!
Posted by Brian Leiter on November 19, 2009 at 07:23 AM in Philosophy in the News, What is Philosophy? | Permalink
A philosopher writes with a pretty startling report of a phenomenon I had not heard of previously:
I recently submitted an article to a journal that uses online Editorial Management software. In general, I like this way of handling submissions. But on this recent occasion, there was a step in the process that I'd not seen before. In the process of entering information on the manuscript, I was asked if the manuscript had previously been submitted elsewhere and, if so, where it had been submitted. Furthermore, this was a required step in the submission process. I don't think I'd even been asked this before. I've since come to find out that at least two other journals from the same publisher [Springer] ask for the same information. So here are my questions:(1) How widespread is this practice?(2) Is the use of this practice increasing?
(2) Is whether or not the manuscript has been submitted elsewhere (and where) relevant?
(3) Even if it's relevant, is asking for this information justified?
Posted by Brian Leiter on November 18, 2009 at 06:04 PM in Issues in the Profession | Permalink | Comments (11)
Posted by Brian Leiter on November 18, 2009 at 02:12 PM in Philosophy Updates | Permalink
A philosophy graduate student writes:
I was hoping you might be able to help me with a follow-up question I had regarding your blog-post on leiterreports regarding the merits of getting a J.D. and a Ph.D. in philosophy. I'm now in my second-to-last year of my Ph.D....working predominantly in political philosophy....My interests have been, over the last year or so, drawing me towards the philosophy of law and I have been considering pursuing my J.D. after I finish my degree, particularly if the academic job market in philosophy is not substantially improved by the time I finish.
My question is this: how much does it matter where I get my J.D. if my aim is to stay in academia and teach (whether predominantly in the law-program or the philosophy department)? I'm sure going to a more prestigious law school helps, but since the more prestigious the school (often) the more expensive it is, if the potential academic job-benefits are not significant it may not be worth the extra expense.
The answer is: it matters a lot if your goal is to get into law teaching (otherwise it matters less). Law school hiring is very pedigree-sensitive, much more so than philosophy hiring, and also without excellence in a specialization compensating for a program that is not overall highly regarded. One need only look at data on where law professors earned their degrees (e.g., here or here) to see that the academic market in law is overwhelmingly dominated by a very small number of schools: Yale, Harvard, Chicago, and Stanford at the very top; Columbia, Michigan, Berkeley, maybe NYU a notch below; Virginia and Penn a notch below those; and then some mix of Northwestern, Duke, Texas, Georgetown, maybe Cornell, maybe Minnesota, maybe UCLA, maybe one or two others.
It is true that scholarly writing is now much more important in law school hiring than it was even twenty years ago--hardly anyone gets hired anymore without having at least one publication post- law school graduation--but before hiring schools even start reading the scholarship, pedigree is used to narrow the pool dramatically. That, I'm afraid, is the reality that anyone thinking about law teaching needs to be aware of.
Law school is expensive, but even the top law schools give 'merit' aid, and those with PhDs or those with potential for academic careers are often viable candidates for that. Should a JD/PhD hopeful pay full price at Harvard over a full ride at Penn? Probably not, and especially given that Harvard Law School is a bit of a wasteland for someone with a serious interest in philosophy, while Penn has a serious commitment to law and philosophy. But should one pay full price at Penn over a full ride at George Washington or Vanderbilt or Emory? There, I think, the answer is probably yes. The latter are all quite good law schools, but in terms of law teaching, the pedigree drop off is probably too great.
Posted by Brian Leiter on November 18, 2009 at 07:16 AM in Advice for Academic Job Seekers, Legal Philosophy, Philosophical Gourmet Report | Permalink
Branden Fitelson (philosophy of science, logic, epistemology, decision theory), Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of California at Berkeley, has accepted a senior offer from the Department of Philosophy at Rutgers University at New Brunswick. Fitelson is the second of the very strong younger scholars at Berkeley to move East recently. (On the other hand, Berkeley did retain John MacFarlane last Spring in the face of East Coast inducements.)
Posted by Brian Leiter on November 18, 2009 at 06:09 AM in Philosophy Updates | Permalink
Here. This guy would be even funnier if he were a bit less vulgar and pornographic. A choice excerpt of the good parts:
Millions of copies will be sold of a book written by someone who can’t write, intended for an audience that doesn’t read, about the thoughts of a person who doesn’t think. God is dead....
If you are sentient, it will pain you to read...this wholly fictional monument to self-aggrandized mediocrity....
The book is less a biography than an elaborate press release. Its 432 pages (with sixteen pages of pictures – and no index) barely feign interest in describing Palin’s life in detail. It moves as quickly as possible to its real raison d’être – a methodical re-imagining of her entire political career replete with more excuses than a Cleveland Browns post-game press conference. Palin has never done anything wrong. The public have merely been led to believe that she is a dangerously stupid, erratic narcissist. Going Rogue is all about setting that record straight, offering a wildly implausible excuse for every crash and bang in her train wreck of a political career.
The theme that permeates the book – and with all the subtlety of an Oliver Stone film – is Palin’s overwhelming magnanimity. The book itself was written solely for our benefit, to set straight all of our misconceptions. Her Hindeburg interview with Katie Couric was done only because Palin pitied the struggling journalist (no mention of how her personal generosity forced her to answer simple questions like a lobotomized rube who had never ventured beyond Wasilla). Her hillbilly-wins-the-Lotto shopping sprees and misuse of Alaska taxpayers’ funds to take her daughters on vacations in $3000 per night hotels either never happened (er, she “usually” eschewed lavish accommodations for simple ones) or were forced upon her by others; McCain aides practically held a gun to her head and made her buy a new wardrobe. She resigned the governorship halfway through her only term for the benefit of the people of Alaska (admittedly, she may be onto something there). Her enormous legal bills stem from frivolous ethics complaints by her enemies, and she has borne these costs for you – out of the kindness of her heart. Buying her book and electing her to the presidency is the least you can do in return, ingrate.
A serious question arises from her narrative. Is she a sociopath with a messiah complex – i.e. she actually believes the version of events she relates here – or is she simply a shameless liar? Does she honestly fail to realize that the McCain team was bending over backwards to protect her from her own stupidity when she rails on about how they abused, demeaned, and stifled her?...
Going Rogue is an irritatingly vernacular, fantastical, and cloying autobiography of a malignant narcissist, every bit as thunderingly stupid throughout as the person behind it. In what world is it either necessary or desirable to spend $9 and four hours to figure that much out about Sarah Palin?
Posted by Brian Leiter on November 17, 2009 at 05:45 PM in Merciless rhetorical spankings of fanatics, villains, and ignoramuses, Of Cultural Interest | Permalink
Sally Haslanger (MIT) writes:
All professional philosophers are invited to participate in a survey on publishing in philosophy. It should take about 10 minutes. It will be useful to have your CV handy as you fill it out. Please go here to find it.
If all goes well, Professor Haslanger will report on the results at the December APA in the symposium on philosophy publishing (Wednesday December 30th, 11:15-1:15). Let me add that if you've been in academia for more than a few years, you will definitely need a CV in hand to complete the survey.
Posted by Brian Leiter on November 17, 2009 at 08:57 AM in Issues in the Profession | Permalink
Sean McAleer, a philosopher at the University of Wisconsin-Eu Claire, writes:
Thanks for posting that link on the Pew Center's report on the dire financial situation facing Wisconsin and other states. As you may know, the recently passed budget here in Wisconsin included a provision enabling faculty (and academic staff) in the UW system to decide, on a campus-by-campus basis, whether to unionize. I'd be very interested to hear what (preferably first-hand) experiences readers of your blog have had with collective bargaining on their campuses, in particular unexpected upsides and downsides -- if you think that would be an appropriate topic for your blog.
Collective bargaining has a lot to do with why Rutgers faculty (not just in Philosophy) are among the best-paid in the country. But I'm sure there are a lot of other examples. In the current economic climate, faculty will be likely be well-served by organizing. Comments are open. Comments must include a valid e-mail address (which will not appear).
Posted by Brian Leiter on November 17, 2009 at 07:05 AM in Issues in the Profession | Permalink | Comments (17)
Here.
Maybe someone pulled a Fodor or Sterelny?
Posted by Brian Leiter on November 17, 2009 at 07:00 AM in Philosophy in the News | Permalink
Posted by Brian Leiter on November 16, 2009 at 12:25 PM in Issues in the Profession, Of Cultural Interest | Permalink
In a world of crude "impact" measures,this may be it.
(Thanks to Ian Blaustein for the pointer.)
Posted by Brian Leiter on November 16, 2009 at 08:27 AM in Issues in the Profession, Personal Ads of the Philosophers (and other humor) | Permalink
Posted by Brian Leiter on November 16, 2009 at 06:15 AM in Philosophy in the News | Permalink
I'm afraid the last line of my earlier post on Party Line Continentals was a bit opaque (or at least some readers have asked about it): when I said "the game is up" I only meant that I wanted to expose in a very public way the charade according to which some philosophers are "pure Continentals," when in fact they simply represent one particular philosophical sect deriving from Heidegger which wants to insulate itself from ordinary philosophical scrutiny by treating everyone else working on post-Kantian European philosophers as "the other."
Posted by Brian Leiter on November 15, 2009 at 07:27 PM in Philosophy in the News, What is Philosophy? | Permalink
He's pretty funny (and vulgar) though. A good laugh.
(Thanks to Matt Burstein for the pointer.)
UPDATE: More wicked Rand mockery (sent by several readers, for which my thanks).
Posted by Brian Leiter on November 15, 2009 at 04:04 PM in Personal Ads of the Philosophers (and other humor), Philosophy in the News | Permalink
Posted by Brian Leiter on November 14, 2009 at 02:32 PM in Of Cultural Interest | Permalink
Story here. And do see the comment by Seiriol Morgan (Bristol):
Quite obviously, no one opposing the impact agenda is arguing that we should be perfectly happy for academic research to have no impact. On the contrary, we think that it should and does contribute very positively to society, including work done in the arts and humanities, and we're very happy about that. Our claim is that it is not possible to measure and quantify that impact, especially within the very short timeframe of the REF exercise, and especially within the arts and humanities. Consequently, if we insist on including the impact component in the REF, what it will actually be measuring is who can come up with the most elegant and superficially convincing tissue of bullshit. The insinuation that it is only out-of-touch stick-in-the-mud mid-career professors who oppose impact also seems highly suspect to me. What's the evidence for that? Lots of postdocs and early career people I know have signed the Ladyman petition. More generally, why won't these very important and powerful people own their own comments, rather than hiding behind rules of secrecy? Due to their positions of power, they surely can't be concerned that anything bad might come of it for them if we knew who had said what. Instead, one can't help suspecting that they are well aware that if we knew who they were they would find it harder to make baseless and disingenuous assertions, because they'd soon find themselves embarrassed when people called them on them.
Posted by Brian Leiter on November 14, 2009 at 11:03 AM in Issues in the Profession | Permalink
Posted by Brian Leiter on November 14, 2009 at 08:48 AM in What is Philosophy? | Permalink
Posted by Brian Leiter on November 13, 2009 at 01:41 PM in Issues in the Profession | Permalink
Now this is important!
UPDATE: As several readers have pointed out, Keynes was never "a boy in Kansas," which, alas, casts some doubt on the veracity of the story.
ANOTHER: Several readers have now pointed out to me that the anecdote comes from Norman Malcolm, not Keynes.
Posted by Brian Leiter on November 13, 2009 at 08:05 AM in Philosophy in the News | Permalink
Not really surprising, but here's the documentation. It's not surprising, because there are only a handful of Canadian PhD programs that compete at the international level--Toronto, Western Ontario, McGill, and British Columbia most obviously, but in particular specialties, also Alberta, McMaster, York, and a couple of others--and research-oriented PhD programs, of course, try to hire from the best PhD programs in the field or in particular specialties. The authors of the linked study appear to have other concerns, but they are surely right that Canadian PhD programs should, like all programs, provide clear and candid information about placement.
(Thanks to Eric Schliesser for the pointer.)
Posted by Brian Leiter on November 13, 2009 at 06:46 AM in Issues in the Profession, Philosophical Gourmet Report | Permalink
Posted by Brian Leiter on November 12, 2009 at 09:53 AM in Personal Ads of the Philosophers (and other humor), Philosophy in the News | Permalink
You'll need to access this essay (from a Festschrift issue of Synthese) from a university computer with subscription access to read the whole thing. An excerpt:
Continue reading "Crispin Wright: "On Becoming a Philosopher"" »
Posted by Brian Leiter on November 12, 2009 at 06:26 AM in Philosophy in the News, What is Philosophy? | Permalink
Story here.
(Thanks to Mark Hopwood and Michael Rosen for the pointer.)
Posted by Brian Leiter on November 11, 2009 at 06:30 PM in Philosophy in the News | Permalink
Posted by Brian Leiter on November 11, 2009 at 04:17 PM in Of Cultural Interest | Permalink
A new Pew Center study identifies nine states as heading in that grim direction: Arizona, Florida, Illinois, Michigan, Nevada, New Jersey, Oregon, Rhode Island and Wisconsin. State universities generally, and Californian ones in particular, are conspicuous by their (in some cases near-total) absence from the October and November JFPs this year already, which has much to do with what is surely the slimmest pickings on the philosophy job market in decades. If, in fact, we are past the worst of the current crisis of capitalism, then these states may yet avert further retractions in their workforces, inside and outside the universities.
Posted by Brian Leiter on November 11, 2009 at 01:24 PM in Issues in the Profession | Permalink
This author follows with some good reform proposals of her own.Conservative rhetoric notwithstanding, the House bill is not a "government takeover." I wish it were. Instead, it enshrines and subsidizes the "takeover" by the investor-owned insurance industry that occurred after the failure of the Clinton reform effort in 1994. To be sure, the bill has a few good provisions (expansion of Medicaid, for example), but they are marginal. It also provides for some regulation of the industry (no denial of coverage because of pre-existing conditions, for example), but since it doesn't regulate premiums, the industry can respond to any regulation that threatens its profits by simply raising its rates. The bill also does very little to curb the perverse incentives that lead doctors to over-treat the well-insured. And quite apart from its content, the bill is so complicated and convoluted that it would take a staggering apparatus to administer it and try to enforce its regulations.
What does the insurance industry get out of it? Tens of millions of new customers, courtesy of the mandate and taxpayer subsidies. And not just any kind of customer, but the youngest, healthiest customers -- those least likely to use their insurance. The bill permits insurers to charge twice as much for older people as for younger ones. So older under-65's will be more likely to go without insurance, even if they have to pay fines. That's OK with the industry, since these would be among their sickest customers. (Shouldn't age be considered a pre-existing condition?)
Insurers also won't have to cover those younger people most likely to get sick, because they will tend to use the public option (which is not an "option" at all, but a program projected to cover only 6 million uninsured Americans). So instead of the public option providing competition for the insurance industry, as originally envisioned, it's been turned into a dumping ground for a small number of people whom private insurers would rather not have to cover anyway.
If a similar bill emerges from the Senate and the reconciliation process, and is ultimately passed, what will happen?
First, health costs will continue to skyrocket, even faster than they are now, as taxpayer dollars are pumped into the private sector. The response of payers -- government and employers -- will be to shrink benefits and increase deductibles and co-payments. Yes, more people will have insurance, but it will cover less and less, and be more expensive to use.
But, you say, the Congressional Budget Office has said the House bill will be a little better than budget-neutral over ten years. That may be, although the assumptions are arguable. Note, though, that the CBO is not concerned with total health costs, only with costs to the government. And it is particularly concerned with Medicare, the biggest contributor to federal deficits. The House bill would take money out of Medicare, and divert it to the private sector and, to some extent, to Medicaid. The remaining costs of the legislation would be paid for by taxes on the wealthy. But although the bill might pay for itself, it does nothing to solve the problem of runaway inflation in the system as a whole. It's a shell game in which money is moved from one part of our fragmented system to another.
Posted by Brian Leiter on November 11, 2009 at 11:13 AM in Of Cultural Interest | Permalink
Posted by Brian Leiter on November 11, 2009 at 06:19 AM in Personal Ads of the Philosophers (and other humor) | Permalink
Readers will recall the threat to close the PhD program in philosophy at the University of Florida during last year's budget troubles. Gene Witmer, Chair of the Department, writes with an update on the situation:
In May 2008, the severe budget crisis at the University of Florida resulted in an initial decision on the part of the upper administration to eliminate a number of doctoral programs, including the Ph.D. in philosophy. The Department of Philosophy at UF is quite grateful for the ensuing outcry against this decision, as it helped motivate the administration to reconsider its decision and opt for a temporary suspension of admissions instead. As a result of these events, however, there is now, apparently, a fair amount of confusion and misinformation abroad about the status of the graduate program at UF. This note is meant to clarify matters, especially for potential new graduate students.
The upshot of the budget reductions in the spring and summer of 2008 was that admissions to the Ph.D. portion of the graduate program were temporarily suspended. The graduate program is, however, divided into an initial M.A. portion, meant to be completed in two years, and a later Ph.D. portion. **Admissions to the M.A. portion have not been suspended**, and admissions to the Ph.D. portion are expected to resume in the fall of 2012.
As things now stand, the department plans to admit and support financially a new class of graduate students seeking the M.A. starting in the fall of 2010. Students who begin the program at that time will be in a position to complete the M.A. in two years and apply to continue into the Ph.D. We are confident that the temporary suspension of admission to the Ph.D. will end at that time, thus allowing students admitted in 2010 to make a smooth transition to Ph.D. level graduate work. The department is committed to bringing our M.A. students to the completion of their degrees and helping them prepare for advancement to the Ph.D. program.
While the events of spring 2008 were disruptive, and college budgets everywhere are very tight, the situation for philosophy at the University of Florida is starting to improve. A new Dean at the College of Liberal Arts and Sciences has demonstrated a firm and consistent support for the Department and has made clear his commitment to rebuilding the program. The Department is in fact hiring this year, despite the severe strains on academic budgets; the advertisement for a tenure-track position in ethics will appear in the November issue of the JFP.
The budget reductions effected in 2008 stipulate that after the three-year suspension of admissions the College may request that admissions be reopened. The Department has every reason to believe that admissions will at that time resume.
Posted by Brian Leiter on November 10, 2009 at 02:54 PM | Permalink
Posted by Brian Leiter on November 10, 2009 at 10:59 AM in Philosophy in the News | Permalink
Peter Carruthers (Maryland) writes:
The recent discussion of the dearth of women in academic philosophy seemed to me, on reflection, to omit a crucial fact. There are just as few women among undergraduate majors (at least in my experience). The percentage of women majors here at Maryland has bounced around between about 25 and 30 over the last half-dozen years, even while our overall number of majors has doubled. This is very close to the percentage of women applicants we get for our graduate program (about 25%), which in turn is quite close to the percentage of women in the profession. If these figures generalize, it suggests that whatever is happening is happening right at the outset.
One possibility is that women are put off pursing a major where they perceive few women instructors. It might be a viciously confirming circle. A small piece of evidence against this, however, is that we did experiment with packing as many female instructors as we could into our intro classes over a three year period, with no discernable result.
Here is another hypothesis. Philosophers use the language of “argument” a lot. We tell our students that philosophy is all about learning how to distinguish good arguments from bad arguments, that philosophy will increase their ability to argue well, and so on. But the word “argument” does double-duty as a label for conflict. When one’s parents argue, this is not generally a good thing. Moreover, “argument is war” is one of Lakoff and Johnson’s famous structural metaphors. We defend our position, attack our opponent’s assumptions and so on. Since women tend, on average, to be less aggressive and competitive than men, and to be more inclined to cooperation, then the way philosophers talk about their discipline might be putting them off.
The idea should be readily testable, if any experimental philosopher were inclined to take this up. Two groups of students in a large intro class could be given a promotional flyer describing the philosophy major. The only difference between the two groups would be that one flyer would use “argument” where the other would use “reason” (“philosophy is all about distinguishing good reasons from bad reasons” etc.). The students could be asked to score how attractive they think the philosophy major looks on the basis of the flyer. If there are significant differences between the two groups, then that might suggest that it would be worthwhile making an effort to adopt the language of reason over argument.
Thoughts from readers? As usual, signed comments will be strongly preferred.
Posted by Brian Leiter on November 10, 2009 at 07:34 AM in Issues in the Profession | Permalink | Comments (45)
The ad has now appeared in JFP:
The University of Chicago Law School seeks to appoint a Law and Philosophy Fellow for the academic year 2010-11. A Ph.D. in philosophy by time of appointment is expected, though in unusual cases a Ph.D. in a related discipline, or a J.D. accompanied by strong training in philosophy, will be considered. Applications also welcome from post-2003 doctorates. Law degree (J.D. or foreign equivalent) is helpful, but not required. The Fellow’s research should intersect with issues of interest to legal scholars. Examples would include work on normative concepts such as equality and punishment; investigation of the philosophical dimensions of a substantive area of law, such as criminal law, constitutional law, sex equality, or property; research that bears on the legal dimensions of intention, proof, or agency; and work in jurisprudence. The Fellow will be expected to contribute to the intellectual life of the Law School, pursue his or her research, and participate in teaching the Law and Philosophy Workshop or a seminar. Teaching duties are modest and will contribute to the Fellow’s research. Salary $50K + benefits + superb research environment. To be considered a candidate for this position you must apply on-line through the University website by February 28, 2010, at . Resume, cover letter, writing sample, reference contact information and research statement should be submitted electronically on the web site at the time of application. Three confidential letters of recommendation should be mailed to Joe Pellettiere at The University of Chicago Law School, 1111 E. 60th St., Chicago IL 60637 by February 28, 2010. The University of Chicago is an Affirmative Action / Equal Opportunity Employer.
Our current Law and Philosophy Fellow is Adam Hosein, who is co-teaching the Law & Philosophy Workshop with Martha Nussbuam this year (the general topic is, "Utilitarianism and the Law"). The Fellow typically either co-teaches the Workshop with me or Martha, or offers a seminar on his or her research in one quarter. (Next year, I am slated to run the Law & Philosophy Workshop; the 'theme' will likely be either 'current topics in legal philosophy' [with perhaps a slight tilt towards core general jurisprudence] or 'disagreement and skepticism' in legal philosophy [e.g., the problem of theoretical disagreements] and in ethics. Again, applications are certainly very welcome from those not working on either of those topics, since the Fellow has the option of simply teaching a one-quarter seminar of his or her own.) Please e-mail me if you have any questions.
Posted by Brian Leiter on November 09, 2009 at 12:51 PM in Legal Philosophy | Permalink
Following up on our earlier item, a grad student on the job market writes:
I received an email from my department's placement assistant today notifying me that she had been unable to get my letters to a search committee. The search committee had requested that all documents, including letters, be emailed. When she emailed my letters, the email bounced back with a notification that the mailbox is full.
This is particularly worrisome, since a full mailbox typically just rejects new emails, and so the search committee will presumably have no record at all that an attempt to deliver the letters was made on my behalf. I have no doubt that I'll be able to clear this up with a phone call - and I will. But for those candidates with less deft people handling their letters, this might have been a real problem. Adding to the number of variables in this process - by, e.g., requiring documents to be emailed - increases the risks.
I appreciate that search committees want to save candidates money by not requiring them to print and mail documents. But that's not worth the risk (to me, anyway) of not being able to complete my file and so not being considered for a job. Search committees that want to receive all documents by email need to ensure that they won't let this happen. One way to do this would be to set the account up via mail software that automatically downloads the mail to a hard drive and deletes it from the server. That way, there is no danger in using up one's space on the server in question. Or they need to be assiduous in printing the materials and deleting the email attachments promptly.
Posted by Brian Leiter on November 09, 2009 at 09:44 AM in Issues in the Profession | Permalink
Christopher Pynes (Western Illinois) reports that his Department is considering creating a pre-law major, and is wondering about the experience of other departments and how the creation of a pre-law track has affected the philosophy major. Readers can e-mail Professor Pynes about (1) how many total philosophy majors their department has, (2) how many of those are on a pre-law track (if they have that information), and (3) how the existence of a pre-law track has affected the quantity and quality of philosophy majors in the department. If Professor Pynes gets enough responses, he has offered to tally the results and will share them here in the future (preserving, of course, anonymity of the departments that respond).
Posted by Brian Leiter on November 09, 2009 at 08:43 AM in Issues in the Profession | Permalink
Posted by Brian Leiter on November 09, 2009 at 07:08 AM in Of Cultural Interest | Permalink
A propos an earlier item, Paul Krugman notices something similar:
[T]he G.O.P. has been taken over by the people it used to exploit....
Back in 1964 the historian Richard Hofstadter published an essay titled, “The Paranoid Style in American Politics,” which reads as if it were based on today’s headlines: Americans on the far right, he wrote, feel that “America has been largely taken away from them and their kind, though they are determined to try to repossess it and to prevent the final destructive act of subversion.” Sound familiar?
But while the paranoid style isn’t new, its role within the G.O.P. is.
When Hofstadter wrote, the right wing felt dispossessed because it was rejected by both major parties. That changed with the rise of Ronald Reagan: Republican politicians began to win elections in part by catering to the passions of the angry right.
Until recently, however, that catering mostly took the form of empty symbolism....
But something snapped last year. Conservatives had long believed that history was on their side, so the G.O.P. establishment could, in effect, urge hard-right activists to wait just a little longer: once the party consolidated its hold on power, they’d get what they wanted. After the Democratic sweep, however, extremists could no longer be fobbed off with promises of future glory.
Furthermore, the loss of both Congress and the White House left a power vacuum in a party accustomed to top-down management. At this point Newt Gingrich is what passes for a sober, reasonable elder statesman of the G.O.P. And he has no authority: Republican voters ignored his call to support a relatively moderate, electable candidate in New York’s special Congressional election.
Real power in the party rests, instead, with the likes of Rush Limbaugh, Glenn Beck and Sarah Palin (who at this point is more a media figure than a conventional politician). Because these people aren’t interested in actually governing, they feed the base’s frenzy instead of trying to curb or channel it. So all the old restraints are gone.
In the short run, this may help Democrats, as it did in that New York race. But maybe not: elections aren’t necessarily won by the candidate with the most rational argument. They’re often determined, instead, by events and economic conditions....
[I]f Tea Party Republicans do win big next year, what has already happened in California could happen at the national level. In California, the G.O.P. has essentially shrunk down to a rump party with no interest in actually governing — but that rump remains big enough to prevent anyone else from dealing with the state’s fiscal crisis. If this happens to America as a whole, as it all too easily could, the country could become effectively ungovernable in the midst of an ongoing economic disaster.
The point is that the takeover of the Republican Party by the irrational right is no laughing matter. Something unprecedented is happening here — and it’s very bad for America.
Of course, the Republicans went off the rails starting with Reagan, and Reagan gave the irrational right more than "empty symbolism." But it is also true that things have deteriorated since then, so much so that Reagan and Bush Sr. look almost normal.
Posted by Brian Leiter on November 09, 2009 at 07:02 AM in Authoritarianism and Fascism Alerts | Permalink




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